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Introduction
Reform of the financial services industry became
a hotly debated issue in the 1980s, and this
debate continues to rage in the 1990s. Much of
the debate has been generated by a growing
recognition that fundamental reforms are
needed in our bank and thrift regulatory systems
to respond to market-driven changes in the
financial services industry. Deposit-insurance
reform has taken center stage in the political
arena, as the Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
covers- and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989
formally commits $159 billion of taxpayer money
to resolve the thrift crisis and mandates that a
study of federal deposit insurance be undertaken.
The overall objective of reform in the financial
services industry should be to maximize the effi-
ciency and stability of the banking and thrift sys-
tems while minimizing the exposure of the fed-
eral safety net, and hence the taxpayer, to losses
generated by insured banks and thrifts. A plethora
of reform proposals have been advanced by the
bunking industry, bank regulators, and the aca-
demic community. These reform proposals typi-
cally can be divided into proposals that rely on
increased regulation and less discretion for bank
management,
1 and proposals that rely on market-
oriented solutions and increased management
discretion within supervisory guidelines.
2
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it
presents the case for adopting market-oriented
reforms to the regulatory system and to the
financial safety net.
3 Second, it summarizes the
literature from one perspective and presents a
cohesive view on the topic. Section I reexamines
the issue of whether banks are special and the
B 1 Reform proposals that rely on increased government regulation ndude
Comgan (1987) and Keehn (1989). These authors propose the use of regula-
tion as a substitute for market discipline, and hence reforms to the federal
safety net. In their separate proposals, Comgan and Keehn wouk) allow bank
holding companies to engage in virtually any financial activity so long as there
is legal separation between the nonbanking activities and the insured banks in
the holding company. In principle, this would capture some of the efficiencies
of an integrated financial services industry without increasng ire sue and
scope of the safety net. However, Kane's (1989b) application of prindpai-ageni
theory to regulatory agencies calls into question the substitutaWiiy of regula-
tion and market discipline.
• 2 Proposals that rely on increased market discipline include Cates (1989).
By (1985. 1989). Kane (1983. 1985. 1986). Benslon el al. (1986. eh. 9). Ben-
ston el al. (1989). Benston and Kaufman (1988). the Federal Reserve Bank ol
Minneapolis (1988). Hoskins (1989). Thomson and Todd (1990). and Wall
(1989).
• 3 For an opposing view, see Campbell and Minsky (1987). Guttenlag and
Herring (1986. 1988) and Randall (1989).
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lated and unregulated. In addition, section I
looks at principal-agent problems associated
with bank regulation (Kane [ 1988b]). Section II
proposes reforms to our system of regulatory




Those who propose reforms that rely on an
increased role for regulation in determining lim-
its on bank powers and activities—and hence a
reduced role for management discretion, share-
holders' control, and market discipline—assume
that financial markets are inherently unstable or
that banks are "special" in the sense that the
social costs of bank failures significantly exceed
the private costs (Corrigan [1987] andTallman
(1988]). Therefore, proponents of increased
regulation are willing to trade efficiency for sta-
bility. Moreover, in principle, increased regula-
tion protects the public purse from losses by re-
stricting the participation of insured depository
institutions in activities that are deemed to be
excessively risky.
The reforms outlined in this paper assume
that the opposite is true; that, left to their own
devices, financial markets are stable in the sense
that in the long run they exhibit an orderly pro-
cess of change, and that, if there is a trade-off
between efficiency and stability, it exists only in
the short run.
4 Moreover, it is the system of reg-
ulatory taxes and subsidies, in our view, that




The banks-are-special argument typically is based
on one of two notions: either that bank failures
have a high social cost or that all runs on indi-
vidual banks are contagious and, therefore, the
banking system is unstable. Since the issue of
banking-system stability is dealt with in the fol-
• 4 The trade-off between efficiency and stability in the short run can occur
only when there are no principal-agent problems associated with bank regula-
tion or. in other words, when bank regulators are "faithful agents" as defined
by Kane (1989b). Otherwise, the trade-oft between efficiency and stability
would not hold even m the short run. The author thanks Edward Kane for this
analysis.
• 5 Fa a comprehensive look at the arguments and evidence as to why
banks are not special, and a list of articles on the subtect. see Saunders and
Walter (1987).
lowing section, we will concentrate on the social
cost of bank failures here. To argue that banks
are special because there are high social costs
associated with their failures, one must demon-
strate two things: first, the social costs of bank
failures are significantly greater than the private
costs of bank failures (that is, there is an eco-
nomically significant externality associated with
the failure of a bank); and second, the social
costs of bank failures are significantly higher
than the social costs of failures of other firms.
What has been the cost of bank failures? Ben-
ston et al. (1986, ch. 2) show that for the entire
period from 1865 to 1933 (the time period
between the National Banking Act and the crea-
tion of the FDIC), total losses were $12.3 billion,
or about 1 percent of total commercial bank
assets. Losses to depositors were only about $2.4
billion, or about 0.21 percent of commercial bank
deposits. Even in the Great Depression (1930-
1933), the losses to depositors were only about
0.81 percent of total commercial bank deposits.
So, in an environment of no federal deposit
insurance and lighter regulation, the private costs
of bank failures appear to have been small.
The issue of the "specialness" of banks rests
on social costs, however, and not on private
ones. Unfortunately, the social costs of bank fail-
ures are difficult to quantify, because measures
of the size of the externalities associated with
bank failures are highly subjective or do not exist.
The first of these externalities is the loss of
banking services in the community or the dis-
ruption of special banking relationships. Banking
relationships are considered valuable because
one service performed by banks is information
intermediation. In the first case, rarely does a
community lose all of its banking services when
an individual bank fails. Kaufman (1988) argues
that in those few cases where the only bank in
the area fails, it is often replaced by another bank
or financial institution, often in the same loca-
tion. Furthermore, liberal chartering of new
banks and the relaxation of intrastate and inter-
state branching restrictions should take care of
this problem when it does arise.
Second, most firms have relationships with
more than one financial institution, and many of
the lending officers of the failed institution find
jobs with other banks in the area, often with the
bank that replaces the failed institution (Benston
and Kaufman (1986]). Moreover, as Schwartz
(198?) argues, it is difficult to believe that finan-
cial institutions interested in acquiring the liabili-
ties of failed banks would not also be interested
in capturing their creditworthy customers, espe-
cially if banking relationships have value.
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of the payments system.
6 Because banks are the
conduit for payments in this country, the failure
of a major depository institution could cause the
failures of other banks on the payments system,
topple the payments system itself, or at least shut
it down for an unacceptable period of time.
However, there is no reason that the failure of
any institution, let alone a large one, should
result in the collapse of the payments system.
Even today, the loss on assets associated with
large bank failures is typically small, certainly not
approaching 100 percent.
7 Therefore, banks with
payments-related exposure to the failed institu-
tion should realize only a small loss, and the
threat of loss from payments-system defaults
should cause banks to limit their exposure to
other banks that are considered to be excessively
risky. After all, banks routinely do this today in
the federal funds market. In addition, the lender
of last resort can immunize the rest of the pay-
ments system from the failure of a single bank
by lending (with a "haircut") to banks against
their claims on the failed institution until those
claims are realized.
8 The Federal Reserve's role
in providing liquidity to financial markets during
the October 1987 stock market crash illustrates
how a properly functioning lender of last resort
can prevent spillover effects from bank failures
or from crises in individual financial markets.
The third component of social costs" is the
causal relationship between declines in the
banking industry and in the level of general
economic activity. Do declines in the banking
sector cause declines in economic activity, or is
the opposite true? A review of the historical evi-
dence by Benston et al. (1986, ch. 2) and
Schwartz (1987) suggests that bank failures are
caused by the declines in general economic
activity, whether the declines are national or
regional.
Therefore, although there are economic and
social costs associated with indhidual bank fail-
ures, these costs do not appear to be significantly
larger than those for other firms. As Saunders and
Walter (1987) point out, the costs of individual
bank failures are much different from the costs
to the economy from a collapse of the banking
system, and those who argue that bank failures
have high social costs often fail to recognize that
difference. Thus, the argument that banks are
special because of social externalities associated
with their failures does not appear to be valid.
Bank Rum and Stability
Opponents of market-based banking reforms
argue that the very nature of bank and thrift
deposit liabilities (that is, they are redeemable at
par on demand) makes free-market banking sys-
tems inherently unstable.
9 They argue that,
without federal deposit guarantees, the banking
system is subject to contagious bank runs. As the
argument goes, deposit insurance removes or
reduces the incentives for bank runs and thus
stabilizes the banking system. Regulation, in
turn, is needed to protect the federal deposit
insurance agency, and ultimately the taxpayer,




To analyze this claim of instability, one needs
to distinguish between rational and irrational
bank runs. Kaufman (1988) argues that a rational
bank run is one that occurs because depositors
have good information that their depository insti-
tution has (or may) become insolvent. This type
of run should not be contagious and, in fact, is
the method the market uses to weed out weak
institutions. Because rational bank runs are essen-
tially a market-driven closure rule, they act as a
form of market discipline on bank management
and shareholders (Benston and Kaufman [ 1986]).
Kaufman (1988) describes an irrational bank
run as one that occurs because poorly informed
depositors mistakenly believe that their deposi-
tory institution has (or may) become insolvent.
Institutions that are truly solvent can stop an ir-
rational run by demonstrating their solvency.
Although these runs theoretically could be conta-
gious, it is unlikely that they would be (except,
• 6 Payments-system concerns are me motivation for the sale-bank pro-
posals of Litan (1987) and others.
• 7 Although toss rates have ranged as much as 50 percent of assets in
small-bank failures, the failure of these banks is not a threat to the payments
system.
• 8 Lending with a haircut refers to the practice of making short-term col-
lateralized loans for less than [he estimated market value of the collateral.
That is. the lenoer estimates the value of the collateral and then "takes a little
off the top" This is usually done when the market value ot the collateral is
measured with jrertamiy.
• 9 The theoretical foundation for this viewpoint is found in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). In their model of a simple economy. Diamond and Dybvig find
that government deposit insurance improves social welfare by removing the
possibility of systemic bank runs. However. McCuiloch and Yu (1989) show
that private contracts could perform the same function as deposit insurance in
the Diamond and Dybvig world. Furthermore. McCuiloch and Yu find that
neither the private contracts nor government deposit insurance can improve
social welfare in the Diamond and Dybvig world if private capital markets exisi
outside the official banking sector.
• 10 For a detailed discussion of bank runs and their positive implications
for economic stability, see Kaufman (1988).
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other banks and thrifts have incentives to provide
liquidity to solvent institutions experiencing runs.
In fact, private bank clearinghouses performed
this function prior to the creation of the Federal
Reserve System (Gorton and Mullineaux [ 1987]).
Moreover, a properly functioning lender of last
resort can prevent irrational bank runs from
becoming systemic bank runs by providing liq-
uidity to solvent institutions experiencing runs.
In so doing, the central bank further relieves
pressures on solvent institutions, while removing
any potentially destabilizing effects of irrational
bank runs, yet without precluding rational bank
runs on insolvent institutions (Meltzer [1986]
and Schwartz [1987,1988]). One should note
that bank runs were historically a statewide or
systemic problem primarily in unit banking sys-
tems, where regional and therefore industry
diversification of assets was artificially restricted
by regulations. Thus, irrational bank runs may
simply be an unintended side effect of branch-
ing restrictions, rather than a natural source of
instability in free-market banking systems.
By suppressing or overriding market closure
mechanisms, federal deposit insurance has
reduced or removed one of the self-correcting
forces that ensures the efficiency and long-run
stability of banking markets. Kane (1985, ch. 3)
and Thomson (1986,1989) argue that the way
federal deposit insurance is priced and adminis-
tered results in government subsidization of the
risks undertaken by insured banks and thrifts.
This, in turn, leads to perverse incentives for risk-
taking by insured institutions and decreases the
stability of the financial system.
Monl Haard
and Regulation
To mitigate the moral hazard (that is, the incen-
tives for the insured to increase their risk in
order to maximize the combined value of their
equity and deposit guarantees) intrinsic in
deposit-insurance guarantees, strict regulations
were adopted that limited the scope of activities
in which banks could participate and the types
of products (both asset and liability) they could
offer. In other words, regulations were used as a
tax to offset the perverse effects of the subsidy
inherent in federal deposit insurance (Buser et
al. [ 1981 ]). These regulations sought to alleviate
the moral hazard problem by removing a large
degree of management and shareholder discre-
tion in the operation of depository institutions.
An unintended side effect has been that these
regulations have made managers and share-
holders less responsive to market incentives and
have reduced the flow of capital from poorly
managed institutions to well-managed ones
(because all institutions are equally insured).
This system most assuredly resulted in fewer
bank failures from the mid-1930s through the
late 1970s, but did so at the expense of the long-
run stability of the financial system, as evidenced
by the escalation of problems in the banking and
thrift industries in the 1980s.
1
1 The movement of
capital from marginal firms in an industry to the
strongest and best-managed firms is another of
the self-corrective forces that would ensure the
long-run stability of our banking system.
While regulation may reduce the moral hazard
associated with deposit guarantees, Kane (1988b,
1989b) shows that principal-agent problems cause
other forms of moral hazard to arise.
1
2 In the
principal-agent framework, bank and thrift reg-
ulatory agencies are viewed as self-maximizing
bureaucracies whose primary task is to act as the
agent for taxpayers to ensure a safe and sound
banking system and to minimize the taxpayer's ex-
posure to loss. In addition, regulators must cater
to a political clientele who are intermediate or
competing principals. Furthermore, regulators are
sometimes motivated by their own self-interest
1
3 -
In Kane's (1989e) principal-agent framework,
political pressures and self-interest considerations
create perverse incentives for regulators that may
cause them to "paper over" emerging problems
in an industry instead of dealing with them early
and forcefully with the hope that, by buying time
to deal with each crisis, the ultimate cost of
resolving it will be smaller. Policies such as "too
big to let fail," capital forbearance programs, and
the adoption of regulatory accounting principles
(RAP) for thrifts are some of the more visible
manifestations of the problem (Kane [1989b]).
• 11 Schwartz (1987.1988) argues that the 60 years of relative stability in
our financial system were due to price stability and not to either deposit nsur-
ance or bank regulation. She argues that one cost of once-level nstabikty is
troubled depository institutions, regardless of whether they are regulated.
• 12 For a general discussion of agency costs and pnopaiagem problems
and their applications m corporate finance, see Jensen and Mecklmg (1976)
and Jensen and Smith (1985V
• 13 01 course, throughout this paper, it is assumed that all politicians and
bureaucrats firmly beheve that their actions are motivated exclusively by the
public interest. The analysis provided here emphatically does not accuse public
servants of intentionally acting in bad faith but. rather, assumes that they do
not always articulate or understand their real motives.
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Government-regulated systems, such as those
operative in our banking and thrift industries,
attempt to achieve stability by setting up a deli-
cate and complex web of regulatory taxes and
subsidies. In the case of banks, regulation has
attempted to achieve stability by limiting compe-
tition between banks and nonbank financial
institutions, both through prohibitions on activi-
ties banks can engage in (Glass-Steagall restric-
tions) and by subsidizing bank funding (through
federal deposit insurance). Regulators are
charged with the task of stabilizing the banking
system by delivering an optimal mix of regula-
tory subsidies and taxes.
As Kane (1985, ch. 5) points out, the ability of
regulators to deliver an optimal mix of regulatory
taxes and subsidies becomes increasingly difficult
over time as competitive forces in financial mar-
kets gradually erode existing regulations and
alter the size and mix of regulatory taxes and
subsidies.
1
4 Existing regulations often are weak-
ened, or are made completely inappropriate, or
become counterproductive. In addition, subsi-
dies inherent in fixed-rate deposit insurance,
access to discount-window credit, and free final-
ity of payments over the Federal Reserve's wire
transfer system increase in size. This effect is
accentuated by exogenous shocks to the finan-
cial system, such as surges of inflation or techno-
logical changes.
These market-driven changes in our system of
regulator}' taxes and subsidies are the beginning
of the ongoing process of regulation, market
avoidance, and reregulation: a process that Kane
(1977,1988a) calls the "regulatory dialectic."
The response of government-regulated systems
to market-driven changes in the size and mix of
regulatory taxes and subsidies is to accommo-
date the shocks. Changes to the regulatory struc-
ture tend to lag developments in the market-
place and are typically piecemeal, usually with
the purpose of either validating market innova-
tions or reregulating areas where market forces
have made existing regulations obsolete.
1
5 This
• 14 Regulatory subsidies arise because banks and thrills are not charged
the lair value of the risk-bearing services provided lo them by the federal
safely net. Regulatory taxes represent the reduction in the value of a bank or
thrift due to constraints placed on its profit-maximization function through
regulation.
• 15 The difference betweer, trs market and regulatory adjustment process
is equivalent IO the difference n exchange-rate adjustments under floating and
lixed exchange rates. Under a fioating-excnangeraieregime, supply and
demand factors m markets cause nearly continual adiustment of the exchange
rate. Under a fixed-exchange-rate regime, the official exchange rate is mam
tained lor long periods of lime, with large adjustments made periodically
may include regulations designed to limit or
prohibit new activities that are deemed ux> ri.sk>'
(for example, thrifts' investments in high-yield
bonds), the removal of regulations that are
unenforceable or politically costly to continue
(for example, deposit-rate ceilings), or the modi-
fication of existing regulations (for example,
risk-based capital standards for banks and RAP
accounting standards for thrifts).
Essentially, the regulatory response is to deal
with the symptoms of a shock without making the
basic structural adjustments necessary to allow the
banking system to adjust fully. This often results
in policies aimed at protecting the regulator's
weakest client firms at the expense of the effi-
cient firms in the industry and, hence, the stabil-
ity of the banking system. An example is the cap-
ital forbearance policies adopted by both the
bank and thrift regulators during the 1980s
(Barth and Bradley [1989, table 3], Caliguire and
Thomson [ 1987), and Thomson [ 1987a)). More-
over, regulatory interventions in the banking sys-
tem tend to thwart market-oriented forces often
enough that normal market outcomes are difficult
to achieve within the limited scope of activities
that the regulators are willing to permit. Conse-
quently, increased subsidies from the public
purse become necessary to permit regulated
entities to achieve the returns on equity that
enable them to remain competitive. This system
minimizes the number of failures of individual,
regulated firms in the short term, but increases
the efficiency loss and the aggregate public-
exposure to loss in the long term. Kane (1989b)
points to the current thrift debacle as a vivid
example of this type of regulatory beha\ior.
The result is a set of financial institutions that
are special or unique only in terms of the regula-
tory taxes and subsidies to which they are sub-
ject. In other words, it is the restrictions on
organizational form, where they can do business,
and what businesses they can be in. coupled
with access to federal deposit guarantees, to the
Federal Reserve's discount window, and to the
Federal Reserve-operated payments system that
make depository institutions special. Addition-
ally, banks and thrifts are less efficient and less
able to adapt to changes in the economy than
they would be if they were more subject to
market incentives, and the resulting banking
system is less stable in the long run than one
governed by market principles.
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The alternative to increased regulation is a sys-
tem of reforms that relies more heavily on
market forces to shape the structure of the finan-
cial services industry." Market-oriented reforms,
such as a reduction in the scale and scope of the
federal safety net, improved information systems
(including the adoption of market-value account-
ing and early dissemination of information), and
the adoption of a timely, solvency-based closure
rule for banks and thrifts, would increase the
efficiency and long-run stability of the banking
system. Rather than blocking or attempting to
circumvent market forces, these reforms would
rely on market forces to reestablish the trade-off
between risk and return in financial services, so
that those who benefit from the gains of risky
strategies would also bear the losses when these
strategies did not pan out. Therefore, there
would be less of a need for regulations, as dis-
tinct from reliance on market forces, to protect
the public purse from losses.
In its most extreme form, market-oriented
reforms would establish a free-market banking
system with no remaining vestiges of the federal
safety net (discount-window access, deposit
insurance, and direct access to the Federal
Reserve payments system). The market would
determine the structure and scope of financial
intermediaries' activities, and market-determined
closure rules would prevail. The role of the
government would be limited to collecting and
disseminating information and to enforcing
property rights by resolving contractual disputes.
However, reforms to the federal safety net neces-
sary for a free-market banking system are
unlikely to be implemented. Kane (1987), echo
ing Downs (1957), argues that subsidies, like
those embodied in the financial safety net, tend
to become viewed as entitlements by the subsi-
dized industry. Industry trade associations and
other special interest groups lobby Congress
vigorously to protect their narrow interests, while
society's interests are sufficiently diffuse tliat they
cannot defeat special interest lobbies.
One caveat to note is that the following pro-
posed reforms have transitional or "switching"
costs that mast be dealt with. This is especially
true of deposit-insurance reforms. These transi
tional costs would be less of a problem if the
reforms were applied to an industry that is already
healthy. Obviously, this is not the case for either
our banking industry or the thrift industry.
• 16 Tins section draws heavily en Bension ei 3 '966). Bension and
Kaulman (1988). ana Kane (1985. 1986. 1987. 1989a. 1989b. 1989c. 1989d).
It must lie recognized that the traasitional
costs, which include the cost of recapitalizing,
reorganizing, or closing insolvent and unsound
institutions, cannot be avoided forever regardless
of whether reforms are adopted. Moreover, as
demonstrated so vividly by the thrift crisis, the
sooner these costs are dealt with, the smaller
they are likeh/ to be (Kane [ 1989b, ch. 3j and
Barth and Bradley [1989]). Therefore, the reali-
zation of the switching costs should not be seen
as an impediment to reform, but rather as an
important first step in implementing any set of
reforms. FIRREA represents a partial realization
of these switching costs; however, considerably
more needs to be done before a comprehensive
package of deposit insurance and regulatory
reforms can be implemented.
Dtposit-lnsunnci Rifonn
Restoring market discipline as an effective con-
straint on bank and thrift activities is the main
purpose of deposit-insurance reform. The cover-
age and pricing of federal deposit guarantees
must be changed so that federal bank and thrift
insurance funds do not subsidize risk in the
financial system.
To restore market discipline to banking, fed-
eral deposit insurance coverages must be -
limited, and remaining coverage must be cor-
rectly priced.
1
7 At the very least, deposit insur-
ance should be cut back to stria observance of
the current statutory limit of $100,000. Further-
more, this limit should be applied per depositor,
rather than to each insured deposit account.
Coverage should not be extended in any circum-
stance to explicitly uninsured depositors, unse-
cured creditors, or stockholders of banks and
their parent holding companies. In other words,
the failures of all insured institutions should be
handled in a manner that reduces the regulators'
and insurers' incentives to minimize insured
deposit payouts while maximizing long-term
exposures to uninsured claims.
Kane (1985, ch. 6) proposes that strict enforce-
ment of the current limit would require some
changes to the failure-resolution policies of the
FDIC and might require statutory constraints on
• 17 Meiion (1977. 1978) snows how opioi prong can oe used to model
and value deposit guarantees. Usmg Merlon's results. Tnomson (1987b) shows
now miormaiion regarding the market prices of innsured and partially insured
deposits can be used to construct risk based deposit-insurance premums lor
nsured deposit balances. Rom and Verma (1986) show how option prong on
be used to derive estimates ol the value of deposit insurance usmg stock-
market data and different closure assumptions
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would preclude the use of failure-resolution
techniques such as open-bank assistance and
purchase-and-assumption transactions, which
provide de facto coverage to de jure uninsured
claimants." Such changes would give the "too
big to let fail" doctrine the decent burial it
deserves and would restore some measure of
market discipline to banking.
However, to truly reap the benefits of deposit-
insurance reform, the statutory limits on cover-
age should be reduced to levels significantly
below the current $100,000 ceiling. Kane (1986)
and Thomson and Todd (1990) suggest that a
reduction in the limit from 1100,000 to $10,000
(indexed to the Consumer Price Index) would
be consistent with a social desire to provide a
safe haven for the savings and transactions bal-
ances of small savers while reestablishing large
depositors as a source of discipline on banks'
risk-taking. Thomson and Todd (1990) point out
that a $10,000 ceiling exceeds the average
(arithmetic mean) insured deposit account in
both banks and thrifts (about $8,000) and that
depositors with balances in excess of $10,000
already have access to US. Treasury bills, which
-are close substitutes for federally guaranteed
bank deposits.
In addition to lowering the insured deposit
ceiling, several authors have suggested that a
coinsurance feature could be added for additional
deposit balances above the full-insurance level.
2
0
For example, if the deposit insurance ceiling
were set at $10,000, the FDIC could provide 90
percent coverage for balances between $10,000
and $50,000 and 70 percent coverage for balances
in excess of $50,000. Other, apparently more
drastic, variations on this theme are possible; the
original (1933) interim deposit insurance scheme
provided for only 50 percent coverage for bal-
ances in excess of $50,000, for example. Presum-
ably, if mandatory closure rules were adopted,
• 18 For expressions of skepticism that regulators vwutd allow big barks
to fail, even if explicit deposit-insurance coverage were reduced or. in advance,
said to be strictly enforced, see Tripaux (1989) and Passell (1989).
• 19 The failure-resolution policies of the FOIC are the process through
which implicit guarantees are issued to uninsured depositors, general creditors.
subordinated creditors, and even stockholders. For a discussion of FOIC failure-
resolution policies, see Benston et at. (1986. cfi. 4). Caligmre and Thomson
(1987). Kane M985. ch. 2), and Todd (1988b).
• 20 Coinsurance was a feature m the original FDIC Act (see Todd
[1988a]). Kane (1983) suggested coinsurance as part of a six-point deposit-
insurance reform proposal. Baer (1985) suggested it as pan of a proposal for
mixed private and public coverage of deposits. More recently. Gates (1989).
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (1988). and the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland (Hoskins [1989]) have embraced the concept of
coinsurance.
private insurance markets would develop to pro-
vide coverage for the coinsurance deductible
portion of the deposit for those depositors who
desired full protection.
An important feature of coinsurance is that it
would establish minimum recoveries on deposit
balances in excess of the fully insured limit. This
would remove an important constraint on the
FDIC's ability to resolve bank failures quickly
without extending forbearances to uninsured
depositors. With coinsurance, the federal deposit
guarantor would not need to estimate in advance
the losses to the uninsured depositors. It would
simply apply the coinsurance haircut to deposi-
tors' balances. If the institution's total losses did
not exceed the haircut amount, the receiver
would rebate to the uninsured depositors their
share of the difference. Thus, coinsurance would
alleviate financial hardship for uninsured deposi-
tors by paying them a predetermined portion of
their deposits up front.
Tin Rots of the
Discount Window
For deposit-insurance reform to be truly effec-
tive, the Federal Reserve should avoid using its
discount window to support the solvency (capital
replacement) of, or to delay the closing of, an
insolvent bank or thrift (Kane [1987]). Benston
et al. (1986, ch. 5) maintain that solvency support
or capital replacement lending by Federal Reserve
Banks is simply another way for regulators to
extend de facto guarantees to uninsured deposi-
tors and other creditors of depository institutions:
it provides an opportunity for these claimants to
liquidate their claims at par, thereby increasing
the ultimate cost (loss upon liquidation) to either
the lender of last resort, the deposit insurance
fund, or the receiver.
This loss arises because, if good assets are
pledged to the lender of last resort to fund early
redemption at par of some (usually the largest)
uninsured claims, then the pool of good assets
remaining to cover eventual payments to insured
depositors and other uninsured claimants is
reduced. The effect of this practice is analogous
to the effect of a leveraged buyout (LBO)
announcement on outstanding corporate bonds
of the LBO target: the pool of assets available to
cover outstanding bonded debt service is
reduced to cover LBO debt service. Rating agen-
cies have no choice but to downgrade outstand-




Best available copyTo prevent the use of the discount window for
purposes other than liquidity support for solvent
institutions (the originally intended and the only
theoretically sound purpose, according to Todd
[1988a]), the following guidelines should be fol-
lowed. First, the discount window should be
available only to demonstrably solvent institu-
tions, with the loans fully secured by sound and
fairly evaluated collateral. Heavy and frequent
borrowers at the window should be required to
demonstrate their solvency, and loans should
not be extended or renewed once an institution
is determined to be insolvent.
Second, discount-window advances should be
made at unsubsidized rates with a penalty for
loans made to heavy or frequent borrowers.
Finally, the discount window should not be seen
as a substitute for the maintenance of a reasona-
ble amount of liquidity by even solvent financial
institutions, except in extraordinary circumstances.
Informtion tnd Mirkit-
Valw Accounting
Kane (1989b, ch. 6) asserts that better informa-
tion systems are needed to increase the effec-
tiveness of both government regulation and
market-oriented regulation of depository institu-
tions. Currently, our regulatory system sup-
presses information about depository institu-
tions, which results in information flows to
market participants that are both noisy and
"lumpy."
2
1 Noisy and lumpy information flows
do not allow markets to make several small cor-
rective adjustments as new information comes
in; instead, they cause the market to make larger
and more dramatic adjustments as market partic-
ipants attempt to process new information. This,
in turn, leads to the appearance that markets
overreact to new information as it arrives.
To improve the informational efficiency of
markets, several authors have advocated the use
of market-value accounting (Kane (1985, chs. 5
and 6; 1987. 1988a], Benston et al. [1986, ch. 8],
Benston et al. [ 1989], and Benston and Kaufman
[1988]). Traditional accounting systems like
GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles)
and RAP result in unnecessary noise in the
information system because they allow firms to
earn' assets and liabilities at their par value (usu-
ally, historical cost) and do not reflect the sub-
sequent changes in their market value. There-
fore, Thomson (1987a) argues that GAAP and
• 21 The information (lavs are lumpy in the sense that large amounts of
information are arriving at discrete intervals, as opposed to smaller amounts of
information arriving nearly continuously.
RAP may not be good measures of the true sol-
vency of a bank or thrift, that both GAAP and RAP
tend to be high-biased measures of solvency for
banks and thrifts experiencing solvency prob-
lems, and that the degree of error in GAAP and
RAP measures increases as solvency deteriorates.
Berger et al. (1989) correctly point out that
market-value accounting systems themselves are
not perfect, as there are many assets and liabili-
ties on the balance sheets of banks and thrifts for
which estimates of market value are not readily
available. However, Benston and Kaufman (1988)
and Mengle (1989) argue that it is possible to
adjust asset and liability values for changes in
interest rates and that, as markets develop for
securitized bank assets, the ability to make rea-
sonable, market-based adjustments to the value
of similar assets in bank portfolios increases.
Market-value accounting is not a panacea and
still results in noisy information streams. None-
theless, it is a less-noisy information stream .than
the one that flows from both GAAP and RAP.
Over time, market-value accounting should
become less noisy as financial markets evolve.
In addition to the use of market-value
accounting, Benston et al. (1986, ch. 7) suggest
that the regulatory community move from sup-
pression to timely dissemination of information.
FIRREA takes an important step in this direction
as it mandates that cease-and-desist orders,
supervisory agreements, and other regulatory .
actions are to be published by the appropriate
supervisory agency. Hoskins (1989) goes even
further in advocating that banks and thrifts
should have the right to release their examina-
tion ratings and reports to the public.
2
2 Finally,
annual audits by independent accounting firms
should be required for all financial institutions.
For small, well-capitalized institutions for whom
this rule could prove to be a financial hardship
(for example, consolidated entities with less
than $100 million in assets), outside audits could
be required only every second or third year.
Both of these changes in the current informa-
tion system would increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of market-based oversight of deposi-
tory institutions and would increase the stability
of the financial system. Markets would be better
able to discriminate among financial institutions
and to force corrective action much sooner than
• 22 Mandatory release of exammat«n ratings and reports by ihe regula-
tors rsa sufficient, but ml necessary, conation tor the timely dissemination ol
information about the condition of insured mswutions. It banks and thrifts are
allowed to release the* examination ratings and reports to the public, then




Best available copyis currently possible, thereby reducing the prob-
ability of bank runs (Pennacchi (19H7]). Coase-
quently, systemic stability would be improved, as
the size and the volatility of the market correc-
tion would be smaller. Better information sys-
tems also would reduce the ability of regulators
to conceal problems in the financial services




Under a market-based incentive system, the role
for supervision and regulation would be radically
different. Regulators would be assigned the task
of enforcing a few basic rules (for example, min-
imum capital requirements, periodic reporting
and public disclosure requirements, outside aud-
its, and market-value accounting), and monitor-
ing efforts would be directed at easuring that
those rules were observed. Any individual or
financial institution able to meet these minimum
guidelines would be granted a bank charter.
Institutions that foiled to meet these guidelines
would be required either to close or to adjust
their operations to comply.
2
3
This approach, proposed by Benston and Kauf-
man (1988) and Benston et al. (1989), recognizes
that a bank's management has the skills, informa-
tion, and incentives to make optimal use of its
resources, while bank regulators do not. As long
as supervisors tolerated failure (either through
market closure or a solvency-based closure rule),
any financial service or activity could be per-
formed by any financial iastitution. as long as it
could do so within the minimum operating
guidelines.
Unlike the current approach toward bank reg-
ulation, which often seeks to suppress market
forces, this approach attempts to complement
and enhance market discipline. Allowing man-
agers and stockholders to make the decisions
governing the operation of their institution,
including scope of activity and institutional struc-
ture, would make them more responsive to
market incentives. The perverse incentives cur-
rently facing managers and owners of weak and
barelv solvent institutions would be neutralized
by supervisory interference as the condition of
the iastitution deteriorated.* The most extreme
case of supervisory interference would lie the
closure or forced sale of iastitutions that deterio-
rated to the point where they violated the min-
imum operating standards.
This approach would lead to a more efficient
and stable financial system than pure regulation.
Fewer resources would be expended in the
enforcement and evasion of outdated rules by
regulators and regulatees, respectively, and those
who took the risks would bear the consequences
of those decisions. Organizational form and
activities would be dictated by markets.
Since market forces would be allowed to
operate unfettered, efficiency and stability would
be enhanced: private capital would be reallo-
cated by market forces to the best-managed insti-
tutions and away from the weak and poorly
managed ones, which would be allowed to tail.
Timely release of information to markets under
the supervisory approach would allow financial
distress in an institution to be detected more
quickly, constraining the growth of marginally
solvent and insolvent institutions. Market recog-
nition of financial distress would lead to an
orderly outflow of funds and an increase in the
cost of funds for troubled institutions, which, in
turn, would lead to more orderly and timely clo-
sure of insolvent institutions and a reduction in
their ultimate failure-resolution costs.
III. Conclusion
At the August 9,1989 signing ceremony for
FIRREA, President Bush proclaimed, "We will
keep the federal deposit insurance system solvent
and help serve those millions of small savers who
make America great..." while "...easuring the
taxpayers' interests will always come first ...."
2
5
Accomplishing both of these objectives will
require great effort in any case, but might be
impossible without market-oriented reforms of
the financial structure such as those described
here.
Moreover, as Kane (1989c, 1989e) argues, the
Bush plan from which FIRREA evolved was not
based on a comprehensive theory of how the
• 23 Pnw IO 1933. the solvency lest applied m Dank dosing cases was
either incapacity to oay obligations as they maturec or saiance-sreei insol-
vency. Since then, me Office of the Comptroller of ;ne Currency has tended to
use only the former "maturing obligations" test, aitnoucfl the s;a:utory oasis
for the latter "Balance-sheet" test remains intact Compare 12 U.S.C. Section
191 (balance-sheet or maturing obligations) with Section 91 'usually inter-
preted as 'maturing obligations" only).
• 24 The Benston and Kaufman (1988) and Benston et al. (1969) proposals
set up several different trigger points (or increasing supervisory interference as
the institution slides toward insolvency and allows regulators to close the insti-
tution before it becomes insolvent
• 25 See "Bush Remarks: First Critical Test' Has Been Passed." American
Bunker. Augusl 10. 1989. p 4.
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Best available copylosses in the thrift industry occurred and were
allowed to grow so large. Consequently, because
the Bush plan (and, by inference, F1RREA) fails
to correct the incentive-incompatibility problems
in the current deposit-insurance contract that
caused the current thrift crisis, there is a high
probability that taxpayers will be faced with
another deposit- insurance crisis in the near future.
It is hoped that the study of federal deposit
insurance mandated by FIRREA, and currently
under way at the US. Treasury Department, will
address the fundamental structural flaws in the
federal safety net and, in particular, in federal
deposit insurance. The purpose of any reforms
to the federal safety net and to our system of
bank regulation should be to increase the effi-
ciency and long-run stability of the banking sys-
tem while protecting the public from financial
loss. The market-oriented reforms put forth in




• 26 The reforms set forth in this paper are aimed at increasing market
discipline primarily through increased depositor and stockholder discipline on
insured tanks and thrifts. Another way to increase market discipline on banks
is through the use of subordinated debt (see Baer [1965). Benston et al.
[1386. ch. 71 and Wall [1989]) and surety bonds (see Kane [1987]t. For con.
Dieting evidence of the ability of subordinated-debi holders to discsune bank
nsk-takmg. see Avery et al. (1988) and Gorton and Samomero (1990.1. Ely
(1985.1989) would use banks to discipline each other through a svsiem of
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